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Abstract: This article investigates the 
Greek and Latin origins of the Scholastic 
dictum that that which is fi rst in composi-
tion (equivalent to Greek sunthesis) is last in 
resolution (Greek analusis). I study the tradi-
tion that synthesis proceeds from prior to 
posterior, while analysis moves from poste-
rior to prior. First I seek the origins of these 
notions in Greek mathematics. I then move 
on to Middle Platonist authors who identify 
analysis with Platonic diairesis, and I next 
move on to a brief survey of the notions of 
analysis and synthesis in some Neoplaton-
ists. I show that both the mathematical and 
the philosophical versions of the analytic/
synthetic method became associated with 
several new contexts.
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negative theology.
Resumen: En este artículo se investigan 
los orígenes griegos y latinos de la máxima 
escolástica que dicta que lo primero en la 
composición (sunthesis) es lo último en la re-
solución (analusis). Estudio a la tradición que 
sostuvo que la síntesis procede de lo anterior 
a lo posterior, mientras que el análisis pro-
cede de lo posterior a lo anterior. En primer 
lugar, busco los orígenes de estas nociones 
en las matemáticas griegas. Posteriormente 
me ocupo de autores del platonismo medio, 
quienes identifi caron el análisis con la diai-
resis platónica. Paso después a un breve es-
tudio de las nociones de análisis y síntesis en 
algunos neoplatónicos. Muestro que tanto 
la versión matemática como la fi losófi ca del 
método analítico/sintético se asoció con 
varios contextos nuevos.
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0. INTRODUCTION 
his article is intended as a contribution to the history of 
the philosophical methods of analysis and synthesis, no-
tions that play an important role in the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas and other Scholastic thinkers. Since the function of these 
notions in Aquinas’ thought has been well studied elsewhere, I 
restrict myself to a brief reminder of this point. Yet since it has 
been claimed that one of Aquinas’ main sources is a passage from 
Chalcidius, who in turn derived these notions more or less di-
rectly from Aristotle, I study the Chalcidius passage in some detail, 
before attempting to show that Chalcidius is merely a fairly late 
representative of a long tradition that goes back, in all likelihood, 
to the Platonic Academy.
Rather than breaking new ground, then, the paper has the 
ambition of providing a survey of a centuries-long development 
in philosophy and mathematics. My approach will be primarily 
descriptive, rather than critical. I believe there is room, in the his-
tory of philosophy, for such an approach, since it is surely neces-
sary to gain as complete an understanding as possible of a problem 
before proceeding to criticize the solutions proposed for it by an 
individual philosopher. This entails that I shall have to give short 
shrift to a number of interesting questions, each of which could, 
and perhaps should, be the subject of a separate article.1 In general, 
I will largely be taking the authors I study at face-value, assum-
ing, as I believe the principle of charity allows me to do, that they 
more or less mean what they say. Deconstructionism can be an 
illuminating approach, but it is not the only one possible, and it is 
not the one I have chosen to apply in this paper.
1. These include, in the case of Galen, the question of the extent to which his recourse 
to the methodology of analysis and synthesis might be largely rhetorical, as part of 
his “mathematical ideology” and “self-promotional agenda”. Similarly, I will not go 
into the question of the extent to which Alexander of Aphrodisias’ recourse to these 
notions is, or is not, faithful to the thought of Aristotle as expressed in Metaphysics Λ. 
These questions, raised by an anonymous reviewer, are important, but would each 
require at least an article-length study for adequate treatment.
T
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There is, however, a sense in which this paper will attempt 
to delve beneath the surface meaning of the texts it studies. It will 
emerge that the methodology of analysis and synthesis has a very 
long history, reaching back beyond the Platonic Academy to early 
Greek mathematics. When someone like Chalcidius, writing more 
than seven centuries after Plato, comes to appeal to these notions, 
it may well be that he does not fully understand them, unaware as 
he must have been of all of their historical vicissitudes. This is true 
a fortiori of Albertus Magnus, Aquinas and his fellow Scholastics, 
who wrote another eight hundred years after Chalcidius. What 
they lacked in historical knowledge, however, they often made up 
for by what Pierre Hadot has identifi ed2 as “creative mistakes”: 
the creative re-interpretation, sometimes based on misunderstand-
ings and inaccurate translations, of ancient philosophical themes 
and problems in terms of contemporary concerns. As Hadot has 
shown, this process often leads to fruitful and interesting develop-
ments on the history of philosophy.
Before we can identify the presence and absence of such crea-
tive mistakes, however, and hence evaluate the “originality” of a 
given author with regard to the tradition and genre constraints 
he worked in, we must try to re-trace the actual historical origins 
of the complex of ideas in question. This was the function of the 
discipline once known as the History of Ideas, and although it is no 
longer very fashionable, this is the methodology I have chosen to 
employ in the present study. On the basis of the material gathered 
here, others will, I hope, be able to apply a wide variety of meth-
odologies to the study of analysis and synthesis in one or more of 
the philosophical or mathematical thinkers I have briefl y evoked 
in what follows.
2. P. HADOT, Philosophy as a way of life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, 
edited with an introduction by Arnold I. Davidson, translated by Michael Chase 
(Oxford, Blackwel, 1995) 71-77. 
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1. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS 
IN THOMAS AQUINAS
A recurrent theme in the work of Albertus Magnus3 and Thomas 
Aquinas is the formula stated in the title of this contribution: that 
which is fi rst in composition (equivalent, as we shall see, to the 
Greek sunthesis) is last in resolution (Greek analusis).
Aquinas formulates the doctrine explicitly several times in 
these terms: what is fi rst in composition is last in resolution,4 and 
conversely what is fi rst in resolution is last in composition.5 The 
via compositionis leads from the prior to the posterior, while the 
via resolutionis leads from the posterior to the prior;6 from what is 
compound to what is simple.7 The modus resolutivus or via resolu-
tionis resolves compounds into its parts,8 whether these be simple 
principles9 or individuals,10 or to intellectual substance,11 otherwise 
known as the transphysicals,12 which are indivisible and the cause 
of things;13 whereas the modus compositivus proceeds from the sim-
3. See, among many examples, ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis 
a prima causa, 2.1.17, p. 81, 12-14 Fauser: Quod autem ultimum est in resolutione 
primum necesse est esse secundum viam compositionis. Albert knows of analysis 
from the compound to the simple, or from effect to cause “according to the order 
of formal causes”, or from the posterior to the prior “according to nature and 
intellect”, and fi nally from particular to universal (ibid. p. 81, 7-11).
4. In Metaph. 5, lect. 4, no. 799, p. 219: quod est enim ultimum in resolutione, 
oportet esse primum in compositione; In II Sententiarum, dist. 22, quaest. 1, art. 
1, resp. ad argum. 2; In III Sententiarum, dist. 2, quaest. 2, art. 3, quaestiuncula 2, 
arg. 1; In De caus. 1, 5, 10. Cf. already Clarenbald of Arras, Tractatus super librum 
Genesis, sect. 21, p. 235 ed. Häring: quicquid enim est ultimum in dissolutione, 
primum est in conpositione.
5. Quaestiones disputatae de uirtutibus, de spe quaestio unica, art. 3, respons. ad arg. 11, 
p. 809, 1.
6. In De cael. 2, lect. 4, 4, 2, p. 136.
7. In Metaph. 2, lect. 1, 278, p. 81.
8. In Phys., 3, 1, no 3, 25, p. 140.
9. Sententia libri Ethicorum, 1, 2, no 35, 9 p. 10 Marietti = 11 Leonina.
10. In Polit., 1, 1, no 16, 27, p. 7 Marietti.
11. De substantiis separatis 5, 62, 22 p. D 48 ed. Leonina.
12. In Metaph. 12, 2, Prooemium.
13. In Metaph. 10, lect. 2, no. 1952, 11, p. 467.
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ple to the compound, or from cause to effect.14 The modus composi-
tivus is to be used in the practical sciences, the modus resolutivus in 
speculative sciences.15
While there are Aristotelian texts that hint at this meth-
odology of analysis and synthesis,16 it seems to me that here, 
as so often, Thomas Aquinas is dependent not so much on 
the text of the Stagirite as on a long tradition of Aristotelian 
commentators,17 writing in Greek, Latin, and Arabic. I will only 
have space to hint at the Arabo-Islamic sources in the present 
contribution, and the role of analysis and synthesis in Thomas 
Aquinas is best left to professional Aquinas scholars, who have al-
ready produced excellent studies on the subject.18 I will therefore 
limit myself to sketching the broad outlines of the history of the 
notions of analysis and synthesis in Greco-Roman thought down 
to the 6th century CE.
14. Summa Theologiae prima secundae, quaest. 14, art. 5, arg. 1; corpus, line 2.
15. Sententia libri Ethicorum, 1, 2, no 35, 9 p. 10 Marietti = 11 Leonina.
16. L. P. SCHRENK, Proof and discovery in Aristotle and the later Greek tradition: a 
prolegomenon to a study of analysis and synthesis, (ed.), Aristotle in Late Antiquity, 
“Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy” 27 (1994) 92-108. Sch-
renk cites Anal. post. 78a61-3, Metaph. Theta 9, 1051a21-33; EE 1227b28-33; 
and, perhaps most relevantly, NE 3.5, 1112b18-20, where Aristotle states, re-
ferring to geometrical proofs, that what is last in the order of analysis seems to 
be fi rst in the order of becoming (ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ 
εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν (...) τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει). 
I agree with Schrenk, however (1994, 100), that while Aristotle probably knew 
of a geometrical tradition making use of the analysis/synthesis methodology, he 
has “not yet adapted it as an explicit philosophical procedure”. Sorabji does not 
hesitate to affi rm that Aristotle “borrows from geometry the idea of analysis”. R. 
SORABJI, The philosophy of the commentators, 200-600 AD. 400 years of transition: 
a sourcebook, vol. 3, 1, Psychology (with ethics and religion); 2, Physics; 3, Logic and 
metaphysics. (Duckworth, London, 2004) 268.
17. E. C. SWEENEY, Three Notions of Resolutio and the Structure of Reasoning in Aqui-
nas, ”The Thomist” 58 (1994) 205.
18. Cf. In primis E.C. SWEENEY, op. cit., with further literature, to which one may add 
J. A. AERTSEN, What is fi rst and most fundamental? The beginnings of transcendental 
philosophy, in J. A. AERTSEN, A. SPEER (eds.),  Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? 
(De Gruyter, Berlin /New York, 1998) (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26) 177-192; J. F. 
WIPPEL, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, ch. III, in Studies in Philosophy 
and the History of Philosophy, vol. 10 (The Catholic University of America Press, 
Washington, D.C., 1984) 62ff.
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2. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS IN CHALCIDIUS19
The earliest Latin testimony to the use of the analysis-synthesis 
scheme I have been able to fi nd occurs in Calcidius’ Commentary on 
the Timaeus, written sometime in the fourth or early fi fth century. In 
the midst of his mini-treatise on matter, Calcidius writes as follows:20
The proof of proposed problems21 is therefore twofold: one 
which confi rms posterior things from more ancient ones, 
which is proper to the syllogism—indeed, assumptions,22 
which are called elements,23 precede the conclusion in 
19. Cf. E.C. SWEENEY, op. cit., 207ff., for whom this passage from Chalcidius is one 
of Thomas’ three main sources for Aquinas’ notion of analysis, the others being 
Neoplatonism (Proclus, Ps-Dionysius and Eriugena), and the Greek geometrical 
tradition. This may be, but the author’s failure to distinguish between analysis, 
abstraction, and division, and her neglect of the entire Old Academic and Middle 
Platonic tradition lead her to the wholly erroneous notion that Chalcidius is directly 
dependent on Aristotle (cf. p. 211, where she goes so far as to speak of Chalcidius’ 
“literal interpretation” of Aristotle’s notion of analysis). As we shall see, if the meth-
od in question can be said to be “Aristotelian” at all, it is so only because Aristotle, 
like Plato and the other Academic founders of the analysis-synthesis method, took 
their inspiration from the common source of contemporary geometry.
20. Chalcidius, In Tim., paragraph 302, Vol. I, p. 530, 5-9. B. BAKHOUCHE, Calcidius, 
Commentaire au Timée de Platon, édition critique et traduction française, avec la col-
laboration de LUC BRISSON (trad.), Histoire des Doctrines de l’Antiquité Classique, XLII 
(Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 2011). Bakhouche: Est igitur propositarum 
quaestionum duplex probatio, altera quae ex antiquioribus posteriora confi rmat, quod 
est proprium syllogismi - praecedunt quippe ordine acceptiones, quae elementa uo-
cantur, conclusionem -, altera item, quae <ex> posterioribus ad praecedentium inda-
ginem gradatim peruenit, quod genus probationis resolutio dicitur.
21. With Chalcidius’ propositarum quaestionum cf. PAPPUS, Synagogê, bk. VII, p. 634, 
6-7: proteinomena problêmata.
22. Chalcidius’ acceptio no doubt corresponds to the Greek lêpsis, “assumption” (LSJ 
s.v. iii). Cf. IBN AL-ṬAYYIB (ob. 1043), discussing synthesis in his Commentary on 
Galen’s Ars medica, British Library Arund. 52 = Or. 57, fol. 5r, quoted in the Italian 
translation (I have not seen the Arabic) by I. GAROFALO, Il commento di Abû l-Farâj 
ibn at-Tayyib all’Ars medica di Galeno, in N. PALMIERI (ed.), L’Ars Medica (Tegni) 
de Galien: lectures antiques et médiévales. Actes de la «Journée d’étude internationale» 
(Saint-Étienne, 26 juin 2006), (Publications de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 
Saint-Étienne, 2008) (Centre Jean Palerne, Mémoires XXXII) 116. Garofalo says: 
“il sillogismo non è nulla più dell’ assunzione [lêpsis! - MC] di premesse semplici 
(...) e da esse viene una concluzione”.
23. On “taking by means of elements” (lêpsis dia stoikheiôn) see, for instance, ALEXAN-
DER OF APHRODISIAS, In anal. pr., p. 379, 21 ff. Wallies.
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order—while the other arrives gradually at the investigation 
of preceding things from posterior things,24 and this kind of 
proof is called analysis.
Calcidius here identifi es two methods of enquiry, proof, or argumen-
tation. One, which he does not name, but likens to syllogistic reason-
ing, proceeds from the prior to the posterior—we will see shortly that 
it corresponds to the method which the Greeks called synthesis—; the 
other, called resolutio (= Greek analysis), proceeds from the posterior 
to the prior. Since his current goal is the investigation of matter, Cal-
cidius announces that he will use the method of resolutio. 
The notions of prior and posterior are, however, relative, so 
Calcidius proceeds to specify what he means by them. After dis-
tinguishing between the eternal intelligibles and sensible things, 
which have a beginning in time, he points out that sensible things 
are primary from our viewpoint but secondary according to their 
nature, while intelligibles are secondary from our perspective, but 
primary in reality.25 Thus, the procedure of starting out from sensi-
ble things—secondary in reality but primary ad nos—and ascending 
to the intelligibles—secondary ad nos but primary in reality—is that 
of analysis (resoluere dicitur quaestionem).26
In Ch. 303 of his commentary, Calcidius sets out to use the 
process of analysis, and we see right away that that it consists in a 
process of abstraction. Our bodies and the world in general possess 
such qualities as visibility, warmth, moisture, etc., which allow us to 
conclude to the existence of the four elements, as well as to the ex-
istence of something that holds together these aggregates of forms 
24. Cf. IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, Commentary on Galen’s Ars medica, fol. 5v, p. 117 Garofalo: “... 
l’analisis avviene cominciando dai principi prossimi della cosa fi nché arriviamo ai 
principi remoti”.
25. The inverse relation between what is knowable per se and knowable ad nos is, of 
course, Aristotelian in origin: cf. APo I, 2, 72a1-5; Physics I, 1, 184a16-25; Metaph. 
D 11, 1018b30-37; Z 10, 1035b12; M 2, 1077b1.
26. Similarly, IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, op. cit., fol. 4v, trans. p. 115 Garofalo, notes that the path 
of analysis is contrary to that of nature, in that nature begins with what is simple 
and ends with what is compound, while the path of analysis “comincia da ciò che 
è più manifesto verso il più oscuro”.
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and qualities. We are to think away all these forms and qualities, and 
what’s left over will be matter.
In Chapter 304, Calcidius comes to the other method, which 
we now learn is called compositio (Greek sunthesis): it is inverse to, 
and follows upon, analysis. In this method, we put back together 
the things we had mentally separated by the process of analysis, 
viz. the genera, qualities, and fi gures.27 At the end of this process, 
Calcidius announces, we have reached the stage of discovering the 
divine opifex, who regulated, ordered and adorned the formation of 
the cosmos, following his thoughts, which are the divine Ideas,28 qua 
models of all natural things. Thus, whereas the method of analy-
sis has revealed matter, the passive principle, synthesis has revealed 
God, the active principle whose mind is equivalent to Providence.
Calcidius thus presents a methodology in which one starts out 
from the sensible world around us and, by using analysis, envis-
aged as a process of abstraction, arrives at bare matter. Thanks to a 
combination of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, this can also be 
considered as a progress from what seems to us to be primary or prior 
(the entities of sensible world) to what is truly or naturally prior, viz. 
the intelligible. This method of analysis (resolutio) is immediately 
followed by the method of synthesis (compositio), in which, starting 
out from what is less familiar to us but ontologically prior (in this 
case, matter), we put back together what we had separated by ab-
straction in the process of analysis, and arrive at knowledge of God 
qua creator of the sensible world.
Calcidius’ account seems somewhat confused. On the one 
hand, we have a notion of analysis as equivalent to a process of 
abstraction; on the other, a sense in which analysis is paired with 
synthesis as part of a methodology which, as we shall see, is math-
ematical in origin. Part of the goal of this contribution will be, by 
27. According to Calcidius, synthesis is to be carried out as follows: order implies harmony, 
harmony analogy, analogy reason or proportion (Greek logos), and reason/proportion 
implies providence. Providence, in turn, implies intellect, and intellect mind.
28. That the Platonic Forms or Ideas are the thoughts of God is in origin a Middle 
Platonic doctrine, but we fi nd in in such Neoplatonists as AMMONIUS, In Isag., 
41,21-42, 7.
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indulging in some Quellenforschung, to see whether these two no-
tions are ultimately reconcilable.
3. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS IN GREEK MATHEMATICS:
FROM THE ZÊTOUMENON TO THE HOMOLOGOUMENON AND BACK
The method of analysis and synthesis is well attested in Greek math-
ematics and geometry, whence it had a huge infl uence on the devel-
opment of such modern mathematical pioneers as Vieta, Galileo and 
Newton. Its actual occurrence in ancient theoretical discussions,29 as 
opposed to its tacit use, is, however, later than one might have sup-
posed, at least insofar as the surviving texts allow us to determine.
3.1. The scholium to Euclid30
The only mention we fi nd of the method of analysis and synthe-
sis in Euclid’s Elements (c 300 BCE), for instance, comes in the 
form of a scholium to Book XIII, in which it is claimed that in the 
book’s fi rst fi ve theorems, synthesis results from analysis by means 
of conversion:31
What is analysis and what is synthesis.
Analysis is the assumption (Greek lêpsis) of what is sought (tou 
29. I add the qualifi cation “in theoretical discussions” because, as Rashed has pointed 
out, texts such as Archimedes’ On the Sphere and the Cylinder 2.4-6, Apollonius’ 
Introduction to Conics 4.16, and Diophantes’ Arithmetic seem to tacitly presuppose 
familiarity with the analysis/synthesis scheme. R. RASHED, L’analyse et la synthèse 
selon Ibn al-Haytham, in id. (ed.), Mathématiques et philosophie de l’Antiquité à l’âge 
classique. Hommage à Jules Vuillemin, (CNRS, Paris, 1991) 131-149. On synthesis 
in Apollonius, cf. J. MANSFELD, Prolegomena mathematica: from Apollonius of Perga 
to late Neoplatonism: with an appendix on Pappus and the history of Platonism (Brill, 
Leiden, 1998), 9-10.
30. M. PANZA, Classical sources for the concepts of analysis and synthesis, in M. OTTE, M. 
PANZA (eds.), Analysis and synthesis in mathematics, “Boston Studies in the Philoso-
phy of Science” 196 (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997) 386-389.
31. EUCLID, Elementa (demonstrationes alterae, lib. 11-13), scholium to XIII, 1-5, 
Vol. 4, 364f. Heiberg-Menge.
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zêtoumenou) as admitted (hôs homologoumenou) <to arrive>32 by 
means of the consequences at something admitted to be true.
Synthesis is the assumption of something admitted <to arrive> 
by means of the consequences to the complete understanding 
of what is sought.
In this text, which is almost certainly a late addition to the text of 
Euclid, perhaps due to Heron of Alexandria, the two methods of 
analysis and synthesis are envisaged as the inverse of one another. In 
analysis, one assumes what is under investigation (to zêtoumenon) and 
proceeds to something generally admitted to be true (to homologou-
menon). When we come to the description of synthesis, however, we 
encounter a serious textual problem.33 If we follow the text printed 
in Heiberg’s critical edition of Euclid, the goal of the process of 
synthesis is identical to the goal of analysis: in both methods, one 
arrives at something admitted to be true (epi ti alêthês homologoume-
non). Yet if, as we probably should,34 we adopt the reading of several 
other authoritative manuscripts, the goal of synthesis is no less than 
the complete understanding of what is sought (tên tou zêtoumenou 
katalêxin êtoi katalêpsin).35 On this latter understanding of the text, 
synthesis becomes, instead of a superfl uous process leading to the 
32. I follow Vitrac in supplying these words. B. VITRAC, Euclide d’Alexandrie, Les Élé-
ments, traduits du texte de Heiberg, I: Introduction générale; Livres I-IV: géométrie 
plane; 2, Livres V-VI: Proportions et similitude; Livres VII-IX: Arithmétique; 
3, Livre X: Grandeurs commensurables et incommensurables, classifi cation des 
lignes irrationnelles; 4, Livre XI-XIII: Géométrie des solides, (Pr. Universitaires 
de France, Paris, 1990-2001) vol. 4, 392.
33. Ms. P (= Codex Vaticanus, Gr. 190, 10th cent.), the text printed by Heiberg, reads 
epi ti alêthês homologoumenon (something admitted to be true). I follow Vitrac in 
adopting the reading tên tou zêtoumenou katalêxin êtoi katalêpsin, given by mss. B 
(Codex Bodleianus, D’Orville X, copied in 888); V (Codex Vindobonensis, philo. 
Gr. 103, probably 12th cent.); b (Codex Bononiensis, Communal Library, no 18-
19, 11th cent.); and q (Codex Parisinus, Gr. 2344, 12th cent.).
34. B. VITRAC, op. cit., 392, argues convincingly that the version contained in P is a 
scribal error resulting from homoeoteleuton. Cf. already A-J. FESTUGIÈRE, La 
révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste. I: L’Astrologie et les sciences occultes. II: Le dieu cos-
mique. III: Les doctrines de l’âme. IV: Le dieu inconnu et la gnose, (Éditions J. Gabalda, 
Paris, 1954) vol. 4, 120 n. 2.
35. The words katalêxis and katalêpsis are virtual synonyms; in fact, the words êtoi 
katalêpsin may constitute a marginal gloss.
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same result as the method of analysis, a method by which we con-
fi rm, amplify, and complete the results obtained through analysis.
3.2 Pappus of Alexandria36
Some six hundred years after Euclid, a more detailed exposition of 
analysis and synthesis was provided by Pappus of Alexandria, at the 
beginning of the seventh book of his Mathematical collection (written 
c. 340CE):37
Now, analysis is the path from what is sought38 taken as admit-
ted, through the subsequent consequences, to something admit-
ted by synthesis. In analysis, supposing what is being sought to 
have come to be (hôs gegonos), we investigate out of what this 
comes about, and again what precedes this, until, backtracking39 
in this way, we come upon something already known or which 
has the rank of a principle. We call this approach analysis, as a 
reverse solution.40 In synthesis, we reverse our steps and sup-
pose to have already come to be what was grasped as last <step> 
in analysis, and arranging what were previously the antecedents 
in their natural order as consequences, and adding them succes-
36. This text has been often discussed by historians of philosophy and science. Cf. A. 
JONES, Pappus of Alexandria: Book 7 of the Collection, vol. 8 (Springer, New York, 
1986); J. HINTIKKA & U. REMES, The Method of Analysis (Reidel, Dordrecht, 
1974), 8; M. PANZA, op. cit., 383-385.
37. PAPPUS, Collection mathematica, vol. II, 31-44. Hultsch, trans. based on J. KLEIN, 
Greek mathematical thought and the origin of algebra, E. BRANN (trad.) (Dover, New 
York, 1992) 260. 
38. Apo tou zêtoumenou. Cf. PLATO, Meno 79d.
39. Anapodizontes. Stobaeus (Anthologium I, 10, 12) quotes the Pythagorean Mnesar-
chus of Samos on the nature of the decad: “Everyone counts as far as ten, and 
when they reach it they once again return to the monad” (μέχρι γὰρ τῶν δέκα 
πάντες ἀριθμοῦσιν, ἐφ’ ἃ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἀναποδίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν μονάδα).  
40. An attempt at etymological explanation: analusis is supposed to come from ana-
palin + lusis, a “reverse solution”. Cf. ELIAS, In Isag., 37, 21-3, discussed below; J. 
MANSFELD, op. cit., 123. Cf. IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, On Galen’s Medical Art, fol. 4v, 115. 
Garofalo: “...questa via è chiamata soluzione [lysis] poiché l’intelletto scoglie in 
essa il composto nei suoi principi, e all’inverso [ana-] poiché l’intelletto percorre 
in essa il contrario della via naturale”.
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sively to each other, we arrive at the goal of constructing what 
was sought, and this is what we call synthesis.
As we can see, Pappus reproduces, in more complete and explicit 
form, the basic scheme we found the scholium to Euclid: analysis is 
the path from the zêtoumenon (what is sought) to the homologoumenon 
(what is agreed upon, accepted, or admitted). Assuming the conclu-
sion of our reasoning, we backtrack to see what its presuppositions 
are, and we continue in this way until we reach some proposition 
already known, or some indemonstrable principle. More explicitly 
than the scholium, Pappus specifi es that this last stage of analysis is 
the fi rst stage of synthesis: in this latter process, we start out from 
the generally-admitted or indemonstrable principle we have reached 
by analysis, and go over the same series of steps we had covered in 
the process of analysis, but in reverse order, so that what were ante-
cedents or presuppositions in analysis become consequences (Greek 
hepomena) in synthesis. By adding all these steps together at the end 
of our process of synthesis, we fi nally come to the zêtoumenon.41
3.3 Heron of Alexandria and the Arabo-Islamic 
geometrical tradition42
One of the missing links between Euclid and Pappus is provided by 
a passage from Heron of Alexandria’s (c. 10-70 CE) commentary 
on Euclid’s Elements. Fragments of this work, lost in the original 
Greek, are preserved in the Arabic commentary on Euclid by the 
Persian mathematician Abu ‘l-’Abbās al-Faḍl b. Ḥātim al-Nayrīzī 
41. In what follows, Pappus then goes on to distinguish between two kinds of analy-
sis: theoretical, used in discovering the proof of a theorem, and problematic, 
used in the solution or construction of a problem. In the former kind, synthesis, 
or reversal of the analysis, constitutes an immediate demonstration of what was 
being sought; whereas in the latter kind, synthesis consists fi rst in a geometrical 
construction or porism, which is then followed by the demonstration.
42. On analysis and synthesis in Arabo-Islamic philosophy, see also A. HASNAWI, Topic 
and analysis: the Arabic tradition, in R. W. SHARPLES (ed.), Whose Aristotle? Whose 
Aristotelianism? (Ashgate, Aldershot etc., 2001) 29-32; 39.
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(c. 900CE). Translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona, this 
commentary by al-Nayrīzī (known to the Latins as Anaritius) was 
well known to the Scholastic tradition, particularly to Albertus 
Magnus.43 Al-Nayrīzī quotes Hero as follows:44
And furthermore, if we proceed by positing just one line, we 
can present two methods of demonstration (al-burhān), one 
of the two of which is the method of analysis (ṭarīq al-taḥlīl), 
and the other the method of synthesis (ṭarīq al-tarkīb).45 As for 
analysis, it is when some problem or other is proposed to us, 
and we say, “We suppose that what is sought46 is extant”.47 
Then we resolve it to something whose demonstration has pre-
ceded. Then when it has become clear, we say, “What is sought 
has been found by analysis”. And as for synthesis, that is when 
one begins with known things;48 then one combines them until 
what is sought is found, and thus what is sought has been made 
clear by synthesis.
While this text provides little additional information above and be-
yond that of the Euclid scholium and Pappus, it does help us to 
establish terminology. The standard correspondences are as follows:
43. I discuss Albertus Magnus’ use of al-Nayrīzī in M. CHASE, In press, Albert le Grand 
sur la dérivation des formes géométriques: Un témoignage de l’infl uence de Simplicius par 
le biais des Arabes?, to be published in the Acts of the Conference on “Damascius 
et le parcours syrien du néoplatonisme”.
44. A. LO BELLO, The commentary of al-Nayrizi on Books II-IV of Euclid’s Elements of 
Geometry, with a translation of that portion of Book I missing from MS Leiden Or. 
399.1 but present in the newly discovered Qom manuscript edited by Rudiger Arnzen, 
(Brill, Leiden, 2009). AL-NAYRīzī, 8, l-8 Besthorn/Heiberg, translation Lo Bello 
modifi ed.
45. Cf. Gerard of Cremona: modi, quorum unus est modus, qui attenditur secundum 
dissolutionem, alter vero modus, qui consideratur secundum compositionem.
46. Arabic al-maṭlūb = Latin res quesita  = Greek to zêtoumenon.
47. Ar. mawjūd. Lo Bello translates “true”, but mawjūd corresponds more closely to 
the Greek on or gegonos, “extant” or “having come to be”, as in Pappus, although 
the Arabic can also mean “found”.
48. Ar. bi-ašyā’ ma’rūfa.
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Greek Arabic Latin (Gerard)
analusis al-taḥlīl dissolutio 
sunthesis al-tarkīb compositio
As has been pointed out by Roshdi Rashed, the methodology of 
analysis and synthesis, known to the Arabic world thanks to Hero 
and other sources, played an increasingly important role in Arabic-
language mathematics and geometry beginning with the tenth cen-
tury, primarily as a result of developments within Arabo-Islamic 
algebra and geometry. Thus, the mathematician Ibrāhīm ibn Sinān 
(909-946) wrote a work entitled Fī ṭarīq al-taḥlīl wa-l-tarkīb fī-l-masā᾽ il 
al-handasiyya (“On the method of analysis and synthesis in geomet-
rical problems”).49 Ibn Sinān’s work was elaborated upon by such 
scholars as al-Sijzī (last third of the 10th century),50 and especially 
Ibn al-Hayṯam51 (died after 1040). For the latter, the art of analy-
sis (ṣinā’a al-taḥlīl) provides the method for obtaining demonstra-
tive syllogisms, resulting in an ars demonstrandi. More generally, 
the continuation of the process until one arrives at “known things” 
(Ar. bi-ašyā’ ma’rūfa) was to become the key point in the later Arabic 
development of the analysis/synthesis scheme. Ibn al-Hayṯam, for 
instance, interprets the “known things” as properties which remain 
invariant even when a geometrical fi gure is transformed: only when 
analysis has discovered these invariant properties can demonstration 
be carried out, thanks to the method of synthesis.52
49. R. RASHED, H. BELLOSTA, Ibrāhīm ibn Sinān, logique et géométrie au Xe siècle (E.J. 
Brill, Leiden, 2000).
50. R. RASHED, Les mathématiques inifi nitésimales du IXe au XIe siècle. 4, Ibn al-Hay-
tham, Méthodes géométriques, transformations ponctuelles et philosophie des mathéma-
tiques, (Al-Furqān, London, 2002) and Filosofi a della matematica, in Storia della 
Scienza. 3, La civiltà islamica, in R. RASHED (coord.), R. MORELON, U. WEISSER 
(col.) (Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, 2002) 483-498.
51. R. RASHED, op.cit. 1991; op. cit. 2002, 157ff.
52. This is not the place to embark upon a description of the fascinating development 
of the methods of analysis and synthesis in Arabo-Islamic geometry and philoso-
phy, for which I refer the reader to the works of Roshdi Rashed and colleagues.
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4. THE MIDDLE PLATONISTS: ANALYSIS = PLATONIC DIAIRESIS
Now that we have made a brief excursion into the world of Greek 
and Arabo-Islamic mathematics, we are in a better position to un-
derstand the development of the notions of analysis and synthesis 
in that age of Greek philosophy often referred to as the Middle Pla-
tonist period. This in turn will provide us with a better grasp of the 
sources of Chalcidius and hence, of at least one of the main sources 
of this complex of ideas in Thomas Aquinas.
4.1  Galen (c. 129-c. 200 CE): 
from the fi rst to the many, and back again
Turning from mathematics to medicine, we fi nd that the great phy-
sician and philosopher Galen53 was quite familiar with the notions of 
analysis and synthesis, as we learn from the introductory paragraphs 
of his On the medical art:54
Three are all the teachings that proceed in an orderly way. The 
fi rst is that which comes about from the concept of the end 
by means of analysis (ek tês tou telous ennoias kat’analusin). The 
second is that <which takes place> from the synthesis of the 
things found by analysis. The third is <that which takes place> 
from the resolution (dialusis) of a defi nition, which we are now 
undertaking (...) 
53. For Galen’s views on the method of diairesis, see J. MANSFELD, Heresiography in 
Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy (Brill, Leiden, 1992) 
330; for analysis in Galen see M. HAVRDA, Galenus Christianus? The doctrine of 
demonstration in Stromata VIII and the question of its source, “Vigiliae Christianae” 
65 (2011) 366; R. CHIARADONNA, Scienza e contingenza in Galeno, in S. PERFETTI 
(ed.), Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale, (ETS, Pisa, 
2008) 40, with further references.
54. GALEN, On the Medical art, I, 274, 1-275 1 Boudon = vol. I, pp. 305-306 Kühn. This 
work had a huge infl uence: it was translated into Syriac by Sergius of Resh’ainā, 
into Arabic by Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, into Hebrew by Samuel ibn Tibbon and into Latin 
by Gerard of Cremona, among others. Cf. N. PALMIERI, Survivance d’une lecture 
alexandrine de l’Ars medica en latin et en arabe, “AHDLMA” 60 (2003) 57-102, with 
further references concerning the posterity of this text down to the Renaissance.
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In Galen’s time, then, the methods of analysis and synthesis 
already constituted, together with the method of defi nition, two of 
the most prominent methodologies of medical research, although 
Galen himself preferred the third, defi nitional approach. Later on, 
in the Latin-speaking world, Galen’s division into analysis, synthesis 
and analysis of defi nition was to be confl ated with a similar division 
transmitted by Boethius:55
And of this [sc. logic], the division is, in one sense, triple, for 
every power of the logical discipline either defi nes something, 
or divides it, or collects it (omnis namque uis logicae disciplinae 
aut defi nit aliquid, aut partitur, aut colligit).
Here, Boethius’ defi nit corresponds, in all likelihood, to the Greek 
horismos; his partitur to the Greek diairesis or analusis, and his colligit 
to the Greek sunagôgê. 
Yet Galen was also aware of a more purely philosophical 
method of analysis and synthesis, as we learn from his De placitis 
Hippocratis et Platonis:56
55. BOETHIUS, In Topica Ciceronis Commentaria, PL 64, col. 1045B. Equally infl uential 
on Latin posterity was Boethius’ alternative division (ibid., 1045C) of philosophy 
as ratio disserendi into a pars inueniendi and a pars iudicandi.
56. GALEN, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, 9.5.9-14, vol. II, 566, 4-26 De Lacy: 
...τά γε παραδείγματα κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς παραβαλλομένοις ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς ὁ 
Πλάτων ποιεῖσθαι. γειτνιᾷ δέ πως τούτῳ τῷ σκέμματι καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν διαιρετικὴν 
ὀνομαζομένην μέθοδον ἧς τὴν μὲν γυμνασίαν ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Σοφιστῇ καὶ Πολιτικῷ 
πεποίηται, τὴν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς χρείαν ἐπέδειξεν οὐκ ἐν τούτοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ σαφέστατα 
μὲν ἅμα καὶ τελεώτατα κατά τε Φίληβον καὶ Φαῖδρον, οὐ μὴν <ἀλλὰ> καὶ κατὰ 
τὴν Πολιτείαν τε καὶ ἄλλ’ἄττα τῶν συγγραμμάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ Σοφιστῇ καὶ 
τῷ Πολιτικῷ διδάσκει πῶς ἄν τις ἀντὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἑρμηνεύοι λόγῳ σαφεῖ 
τε ἅμα καὶ συντόμῳ τὸ σημαινόμενον αὐτῆς, ὅντινα λόγον ὁρισμόν τε καὶ ὅρον 
ἐξαιρέτως ἐκάλεσαν οἱ μετὰ Πλάτωνα. ἐν δὲ τῷ Φιλήβῳ καὶ τῷ Φαίδρῳ δείκνυσιν 
εἰς τεχνῶν σύστασιν ἀναγκαιοτάτην εἶναι τὴν διαιρετικὴν καὶ συνθετικὴν θεωρίαν 
γεγυμνάσθαι τε κελεύει διττῶς κατ’ αὐτὴν ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ γενικωτάτου 
καταβαίνοντας ἐπὶ τὰ μηκέτι τομὴν δεχόμενα διὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ διαφορῶν, δι’ 
ὧν καὶ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν ἐδεδείχειν συνισταμένους ἐν Σοφιστῇ καὶ Πολιτικῷ, 
ἔμπαλιν δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων πολλῶν ὄντων ἀναβαίνοντας ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον γένος 
κατὰ σύνθεσιν· ὁδὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι μίαν ἀμφοῖν, ὁδοιπορίαν δὲ διττὴν ἀπὸ θατέρου 
τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ θάτερον ἐναλλὰξ ἰόντι.
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... Plato recommended that we carry out our examples in ac-
cordance with what is the same in things being compared. A 
kind of neighbor to this scheme is the one by means of the 
so-called divisive method (kata tên diairetikên onomazomenên 
methodon). Plato carried out the practice of it in the Sophist 
and the Statesman, but he showed its usefulness not only in 
these, but in a way that is simultaneously most clear and most 
complete, according to the Philebus57 and the Phaedrus, but 
also in the Republic and in other works. In the Sophist and the 
Statesman, then, he teaches how, instead of the appellation 
(prosêgoria), one might explain its meaning in a discourse that 
is both clear and concise,58 which discourse Plato’s succes-
sors specially called a defi nition and a term (horismos te kai 
horon). In the Philebus and the Phaedrus, he shows that for 
the constitution of the technical arts, the theory of division 
and synthesis is most necessary, and he recommends that one 
should be trained in it in two ways: by descending from what is 
fi rst and most generic to the things that are no longer susceptible 
of division, by means of the intermediary differences, by which he 
had shown in the Sophist and the Statesman that defi nitions 
are constituted, and contrariwise, ascending from the many most 
specifi c things to the fi rst genus, via synthesis. For the path is the 
same for both, but the journey is twofold, going alternately 
from one of the fi rst things to the other. 
Galen then goes on to quote Phaedrus 265c-e. He thus knows of a 
philosophical method of analysis, here equated with ‘division’ (di-
57. For the Philebus cf., for instance, DAMASCIUS, In Phileb., 52-56, with the notes to 
the Budé edition by VAN RIEL ET AL. (ed.) (Paris, 2008); AMMONIUS, In anal. pr., 
8, 12-13 (not p. 79, 9-12, as indicated by SCHRENK, op. cit., 96).
58. Galen discussed replacing names by defi nitions in his lost On Demonstration; cf. De 
methodo medendi, vol. X, 39 Kühn, cited by R. CHIARADONNA, Le traité de Galien 
Sur la démonstation et sa postérité tardo-antiqui, in R. CHIARADONNA, F. TRABAT-
TONI (eds.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of 
the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop (Brill, Leiden, 2009), 61. It 
is also an important stage in the methodology outlined in the eighth book of the 
Stromata of Clementa of Alexandria, who may have derived in from Galen; cf. 
HAVRDA, op. cit., 360.
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airesis), which descends from what is ontologically prior, the most 
generic genera, to what is posterior, viz. the ultima species: it serves 
to construct defi nitions. He also speaks of a method of synthesis 
which, starting out from the result of analysis, reverses the itinerary 
and proceeds from the ultimate species to the most generic genera. 
He fi nds both methods sketched at Phaedrus 265c-e. 
We begin to glimpse the relevance of these Platonic methods 
to the Aristotelian doctrine of demonstration, in which—at least 
according to the interpretation of the ancient commentators—the 
achievement of a defi nition is a prerequisite for demonstration 
properly so called.59 There is an important difference between the 
accounts of Galen and Chalcidius, however: for Galen the analytic/
dihairetic method constitutes a path from above to below, while 
synthesis is a path from below to above; as we saw, the reverse was 
true for Chalcidius. If pressed, of course, the Latin author could 
invoke his doctrine that what seems to us to be prior or higher is in 
fact posterior or lower, and vice versa.
Elsewhere, Galen himself claims that he himself has made use 
of these methods. In his treatise On the differences between pulses (vol. 
8, p. 601-606 Kuhn), while criticizing Archigenes60 and his follow-
ers, he boasts that he has created a diagram illustrating the 27 three-
dimensional and nine one-dimensional differences of pulses:
59. Cf. APo 75b31; 90b23: αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὁρισμοί. Aristotle’s actual attitude 
to the relationship between defi nition and demonstration is, of course, highly 
complex and controversial; cf. for instance J. MANSFELD, op. cit. 1992, 330; O. 
HARARI, Knowledge and demonstration: Aristotle’s Posterior analytics (Kluwer, Dor-
drecht/Boston, 2004); M. DESLAURIERS, Aristotle on defi nition, (Brill, Leiden/Bos-
ton, 2007). But the ancient commentators take for granted that defi nitions are 
the principles of demonstration; in particular, as Philoponus points out (In Apo, p. 
334, 16-17 Wallies), the middle term in a demonstrative syllogism is a defi nition. 
On the link between defi nition and demonstration, cf. THEMISTIUS, In APo, 21, 
25-28; In de an., 5, 9; PROCLUS, In Parm., 980, 34-982, 13; PHILOPONUS, In APo 
109, 9-110, 2; 344, 6-346, 29; PHILOPONUS, In de an., 231, 13-232, 20; OLYMPIO-
DORUS, In Gorg., 5, 2; ELIAS, In Isag., 9, 24; DAVID, In Isag., 90, 3-4: EUSTRATIUS, 
In APo II, 51, 16-22; 55, 15-56, 4; 104, 18; EUSTRATIUS, In EN I, 77, 17, etc. Cf. 
THOMAS AQUINAS, In APo II, Lectio 2, 9: Defi nitiones enim sunt principia dem-
onstrationum, ut in primo habitum est.
60. Archigenes of Apamea was a well-known Eclectic physician in the reign of Trajan.
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How is it, though, that none of them shows he has made use 
of the dialectical method for the enumeration of the multi-
tude in each genus, or the synthetic method for the discovery 
of fi rst things? Yet only dialecticians can use these methods, 
sometimes rising up from individuals, limitless in multiplic-
ity, to that one, fi rst genus of all, through the intermediary 
generic and specifi c differences, sometimes again going from 
that <genus> to what is unlimited through the same intermedi-
ary things. But no one has dared to verify by any method the 
number either of the primary genera or of the differences that 
come about from its division. Yet we have done this...
Here, Galen once again displays his familiarity with a two-fold path, 
analytic and synthetic, although here again he uses the term ‘di-
hairetic’ or ‘divisive’ instead of ‘analytic’. Dihairetics is used to break 
genera down into their species, while synthesis serves to fi nd the high-
est genera. Synthesis starts out from individuals—Chalcidius would 
say, from posterior things—and proceeds through the intermediary 
differentiae, both specifi c and generic, until it reaches the highest 
genus; whereas dihaeretics/analysis starts out from the highest genus 
and proceeds, by way of the same differentiae (also, presumably, this 
time examined in the reverse order), toward individuals.
Galen also invokes the methods of analysis and synthesis at 
length in his On the Passions and Errors of the Soul, p. 78 f. De Boer, 
but precisely what they consist in is far from clear.61 Analysis, at any 
rate, seems to involve subsuming a specifi c case under a rule that 
has already been demonstrated deductively; synthesis is then used, 
covering the same itinerary in the opposite direction. It may well 
be that Galen discussed the methods of analysis and synthesis in 
his infl uential On Demonstration, but since this work is lost, we are 
reduced to speculation on this point.62
61. On this diffi cult passage, see N. CHIARADONNA, op. cit. 2008, 23 n. 40; HAVRDA, 
op.cit., 366, with further literature.
62. On the De Demonstratione see especially HAVRDA, op. cit.; N. CHIARADONNA, op. 
cit. 2009. A new edition of the surviving fragments is in preparation by M. Rashed 
and R. Chiaradonna.
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4.2 Celsus and Origen
In his Contra Celsum, written around 250, Origen quotes from the 
Alêthês logos of the pagan philosopher Celsus, written around 177 
and hence contemporary with Galen. In the seventh book of his 
work, Origen quotes Celsus on Plato as an authority on theology, 
citing the famous remark from the Timaeus (28c) that the father and 
maker of the universe is hard to fi nd and impossible to reveal to 
everyone even when found. Celsus continues:63
You can see how the path of truth is sought by prophets and 
philosophers, and how Plato knew that it is ‘impossible’ for all 
to take this path. But since for this reason it has been discovered 
by wise men how we might discover some concept of the unnamable 
and fi rst, which would make him manifest either through synthesis 
<of things> above other things64 or by analysis from them or by anal-
ogy, I wish to teach about what is otherwise ineffable, but I 
would be amazed if you, who are fully bound to the fl esh and 
see nothing pure, were able to follow.
Celsus thus knows a triad of means for knowing the unknowable 
God: synthesis, analysis, and analogy. Unfortunately, he gives us 
few details of these methods, or at least Origen has not transmit-
ted any further explanation of them.65 A bit further on, however, 
Origen, summing up Celsus’ beliefs, draws a parallel between 
63. ORIGEN, Contra Celsum, VII, 42; H. DÖRRIE, M. BALTES (eds.), Der Platonismus in 
der Antike. Grundlagen – System – Entwicklung. 7, Die philosophische Lehre des Pla-
tonismus. Theologia Platonica. 1, Bausteine 182-205: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, 
(Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 2008) 76-78.
64. Hê sunthesis hê epi ta alla: “auf die Wege der Addition zu allem anderen hinzu” H. 
DÖRRIE, M. BALTES, op. cit., 79. For FESTUGIÈRE, op. cit., 120ff. this method of 
synthesis is equivalent to the via eminentiae found elsewhere in the Middle Pla-
tonic tradition, while for Krämer (1964, 105) it instead a reversal of the method 
of abstraction, viz. a via positionis or additionis.
65. In fact, Origen quotes Celsus on the method of analogy at VII, 45, but appears 
to have left out precisely Celsus’ description of the methods of synthesis and 
analysis; cf. Festugière 1954, 117 n. 3.
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the latter’s three methods of knowing God and those used by 
geometers:66 
Celsus thinks that God can be known either by synthesis above 
other things (hê sunthesis hê epi ta alla), which analogous to what 
is called synthesis among the geometers, or by analysis from 
other things, or by that analogy which is analogous to the anal-
ogy among them [sc. the geometers].
Among modern scholars, Origen’s interpretation was unceremoni-
ously dismissed by Festugière,67 who claimed that the geometrical 
methods of analysis, synthesis and analogy were inapplicable to the 
search for God. In view of the evidence from Chalcidius and Galen 
we have examined here, however, and the texts we shall study below, 
Festugière’s position seems highly debatable.
4.3 Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-c. 215)68
Like Celsus, Origen’s teacher Clement of Alexandria was also aware 
of analysis as a process of abstraction:69
...progressing to the fi rst intellection through analysis, taking 
our starting-point by analysis from the things that underlie 
66. Origen, Contra Celsum, 7.44: Κέλσος μὲν οὖν ἤτοι τῇ συνθέσει τῇ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα 
ἀνάλογον τῇ παρὰ τοῖς γεωμέτραις καλουμένῃ συνθέσει ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλύσει 
ἢ καὶ ἀναλογίᾳ ἀνάλογον τῇ παρὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀναλογίᾳ οἴεται γινώσκεσθαι τὸν θεόν.
67. Festugière 1954, 120: “Origène voit ici les trois méthodes mathématiques d’ana-
lyse, de synthèse, de proportion. Or cette exégèse est fausse”.
68. For the dates of the Stromata (terminus post quem 192?), see for instance Havrda 
2011, p. 373 n. 121.
69. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 5.11.71.2-4: τὸν δὲ ἐποπτικὸν ἀναλύσει ἐπὶ τὴν 
πρώτην νόησιν προχωροῦντες, δι’ ἀναλύσεως ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν 
ποιούμενοι, ἀφελόντες μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὰς φυσικὰς ποιότητας, περιελόντες δὲ τὴν 
εἰς τὸ βάθος διάστασιν, εἶτα τὴν εἰς τὸ πλάτος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν εἰς τὸ μῆκος· 
τὸ γὰρ ὑπολειφθὲν σημεῖόν ἐστι μονὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν θέσιν ἔχουσα, ἧς ἐὰν περιέλωμεν 
τὴν θέσιν, νοεῖται μονάς. εἰ τοίνυν, ἀφελόντες πάντα ὅσα πρόσεστι τοῖς σώμασιν 
καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀσωμάτοις, ἐπιρρίψαιμεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ 
κἀκεῖθεν εἰς τὸ ἀχανὲς ἁγιότητι προΐοιμεν, τῇ νοήσει τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἁμῇ γέ πῃ 
προσάγοιμεν <ἄν>, οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν,  ὃ δὲ μή ἐστι γνωρίσαντες.
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him, subtracting physical qualities from the body, stripping off 
extension in the direction of depth, then that which is in the 
direction of breadth, and after these that which is in the direc-
tion of length. The point that is left over is a monad, which, 
as it were, has position,70 and if we remove its position, one 
conceives of the monad. If, then, having subtracted everything 
that pertains to bodies and the so-called incorporeals, we were 
to hurl ourselves into the magnitude of Christ (...) we would 
somehow draw near to the intellection of the Pantocrator, 
knowing not what He is, but what He is not.
The Middle Platonist philosopher Alcinoos is familiar with a similar 
scheme:71
Let the fi rst thinking [sc. of God] be that which takes place by ab-
straction [sc. of the divine epithets previously enumerated], as we 
have thought of the point by abstraction (kata aphairesin) from the 
sensible, thinking of a surface, then a line, and fi nally the point.
Here, as in several other Middle Platonic texts,72 the process of 
analysis is conceived along the lines of a reversal of the emanation-
ist scheme current in Plato’s Academy: from One or the Monad 
emanates the Indivisible Dyad;73 from the combination of the One 
and the Indivisible Dyad there results number; then, in a process 
70. monas (...) thesin ekhonta. Cf. Arist., Phys., B. 227 a 27; Metaph. 5.6, 1016b10ff.; 
Philoponus, In de an., 166, 31; Thomas Aquinas, 1 anal. 41 a; 1 anim. 11 b; 1 met. 
2 i; cf. 5 met. 8 c; 5 phys. 5 i.
71. Didaskalikos, X, 5, p. 165, 16ff. Hermann; H. DÖRRIE, M. BALTES, op. cit., 190.3. 
This text, with its presentation of the three methods of approach to God which 
are almost, but perhaps not quite, identical to those of Celsus, has often been 
studied: for bibliography see Whittaker’s Budé edition p. 106-107 n. 203; H. 
DÖRRIE, M. BALTES, op. cit., 377ff.
72. Especially Plutarch, Quaestiones Platonicae 3, 1001F-1002A. Cf. also Philo, De 
somn. I, 186f.
73. One of several ways this is envisioned as happening is by the process of episun-
thesis, “addition” or “combination”; cf. H-J. KRÄMER, Der Ursprung der Geistme-
taphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin, 
(Schippers, Amsterdam, 1964) 320.
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whereby dimensions are successively added, the point, line, surface, 
and solid body emerge, followed by qualities. To rise back up from 
the sensible world in which we fi nd ourselves, we mentally reverse 
this process, removing all qualities to reach geometrical body, then 
removing depth, breadth and length to arrive at the point. When we 
remove position from the latter, we have arrived at the intelligible 
Monad, which Clement somewhat clumsily identifi es with Christ.
Texts such as those from Clement, Alcinoos, and others, 
suggest that we have to do here with an Old Academic scheme of 
thought, which may go back to the unwritten doctrines of Plato 
himself.74 To quote Krämer,75
The threefold division of theological methods in Celsus VII 
42 (...) and, with slight divergence, in Albinos Didask. X 5, p. 
165, 14ff. H. allows us to recognize that an ‘additive’-positive 
(sunthesis, cf. Alb. Did. c. V 4, p. 157, 9 ff. H.) and an ‘abstrac-
tive’-negative procedure (analusis-aphairesis) completed one 
another in an antithetical way.
If Krämer is right, then just as in the mathematical method, where 
an initial “inductive” analytical ascent from a supposition to an 
agreed-upon principle is then confi rmed by a “deductive”/demon-
strative, synthetic descent from that principle to the question under 
investigation, we have in the Middle Platonic theological tradition 
a method by which one uses analysis to start out from the sensi-
ble world and, by a method of abstraction similar to that used to 
conceive of a mathematical point, arrives at the intelligible or the 
One beyond it. In turn, this analytical ascent can be confi rmed by 
“synthetic” descent from the highest principles, in which one knows 
God by contemplating the world that derives from Him.76
74. H-J. KRÄMER, op. cit., 106f.; 118; 343ff. On analysis in Plato, see for instance S. 
MENN, Plato and the Method of Analysis, “Phronesis” 47 (2002) 193-223.
75. H-J. KRÄMER, op. cit., 350. My translation.
76. As examples of this kata sunthesin method, Krämer cites Plotinus V 4, 1, 1; V 5, 
6, 12-34; V 5 13, 9-18; DAMASCIUS, De princ. c. 28 p. 51, 1 Ruelle; Ps.-Dionysius, 
De div. nom. II; myst. theol. II f.
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Returning to Clement of Alexandria, we fi nd that he was also 
familiar with the method of synthesis as complementary to that of 
analysis, which he discusses, for instance, in the context of his de-
scription of dialectic in the eighth book of his Stromata:77
Geometrical analysis and synthesis resemble dialectical division and 
defi nition, and we revert (anatrekhein) from division toward what 
is simpler and more principial. Indeed, we divided the genus of 
the thing being sought into the species inherent within it: for 
instance, in the case of man, we divide ‘animal’, which is the 
genus, into the species that appear, viz. mortal and immortal, 
and thus, always cutting the genera that seem to be compound 
into the simpler species, we come to what is sought, which no 
longer allows a cut. For once we have divided ‘animal’ into 
‘mortal’ and ‘immortal’, then, however, ‘mortal’ into ‘terrestrial’ 
and ‘aquatic’, and again ‘terrestrial’ into ‘winged’ and ‘footed’, 
and dividing in this way the species proximate to what is being 
sought, which also contains what is being sought, we arrive, by 
cutting, at the simplest species, which contains nothing other 
than what is being sought. For once again, we divide ‘footed’ 
into ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’; then, selecting from the species 
taken from the division those that are proximate to ‘man’ and 
putting them together into one logos, <we have> the defi nition 
of man, which is ‘a mortal, terrestrial, footed, rational animal’.
Here, Clement agrees with Galen in affi rming that analysis is analo-
gous to Platonic diairesis, but he spells out what Galen had only 
hinted at: how one uses analysis and synthesis to construct a defi ni-
tion. The algorithm for fi nding the defi nition of man,78 for instance, 
is relatively straightforward: starting with the genus, animal, we di-
vide it dichotomously into mortal and immortal. From these two 
options, we then choose the one most appropriate to man, in this 
case mortal, which we again divide dichotomously. We continue 
77. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, Stromata, 8.6.18.1-19.1.
78. Cf. ALCINOOS, Didask, V, p. 157, 27-36.
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 103-139
QUOD EST PRIMUM IN COMPOSITIONE, EST ULTIMUM IN RESOLUTIONE
127
the procedure until we arrive at the simplest species, in this case 
‘rational’. To construct our defi nition, we simply add to the genus 
the differentiae we have chosen at each stage, ending up, in the case 
of ‘man’, with ‘mortal, terrestrial, footed, rational animal’. 
Clement thus has the merit of making explicit the similarity 
between dialectical division and defi nition, on the one hand, and 
geometrical analysis and synthesis on the other. As for Galen, from 
whom Clement may have derived his material, analysis is similar to 
Platonic diairesis, while synthesis is analogous to putting together 
the results of this dihairetic procedure in order to construct a defi ni-
tion. He thus reminds us of the mathematical notion of analysis and 
synthesis we have studied above.79
5. ALCINOOS 
As Van Winden80 and Waszink81 pointed out long ago, the closest 
Greek parallel to our Chalcidius passage comes from chapter 5 of 
the Didaskalikos of Alcinoos, a Middle Platonist philosopher roughly 
contemporary with Galen but about whom, as about Chalcidius, we 
know almost nothing.
In this chapter of his philosophical handbook, Alcinoos is de-
scribing the task of dialectics, which investigates the essence of each 
thing in two ways: either from above (anôthen) by division and defi -
nition, or from below (katôthen) by means of analysis (analutikôs).82 
Accidents, for their part, are also to be investigated in one of two 
ways: either from the things that are contained, by induction (di’ 
79. It may well be the case, as argued persuasively by HAVRDA, op. cit., that the mate-
rial in the controversial eighth book of Clement’s Stromata in fact derives from 
Galen’s lost work On Demonstration. Yet the scheme is hardly original with Galen, 
as I hope to show in this paper. 
80. J. C. M. VAN WINDEN, 1959. Calcidius on Matter. His Doctrine and Sources. A 
Chapter in the History of Platonism, “Philosophia Antiqua” 9 (1959).
81. J. H. WASZINK (ed.), Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, (In-
stituti Warburgiani/E. J. Brill, Londinii/Leidae, 1962) (Plato Latinus, 4; Corpus 
Platonicum medii aevi; Corpus philosophorum medii aevi).
82. Cf. Calcidius on the resolutio quae <ex> posterioribus a praecedentium indaginem 
gradatim peruenit.
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epagôgês), or from the things that contain, by syllogism (dia sullogis-
mou). There are therefore fi ve parts of dialectic: division, defi nition, 
analytics, induction, and syllogism.83
Discussing these fi ve subdivisions in turn, Alcinoos begins with 
division (diairesis), which he breaks down into fi ve sub-headings,84 
and then goes on to quickly deal with defi nition, which, as we have 
seen from Galen and Clement, is obtained as a result of division. 
Alcinoos now moves on to analysis.85 There are, he tells us (p. 
157, 11ff. Hermann), three kinds:
1. That which is an ascent (anodos) from sensible things to the 
fi rst intelligibles.
2. That which is an ascent (anodos) from things that are shown 
or suggested to the indemonstrable, immediate premises; and fi nally
3. That which ascends from a hypothesis to the non-hypothet-
ical principles.
Of these three types, the fi rst represents the familiar ascent 
from the intelligible to the sensible as described in Diotima’s speech 
in Plato’s Symposium (201a6-e1). In the third type of analysis, one 
begins by supposing what is under investigation, and then examines 
what follows from this supposition. If one subsequently needs to 
account for this hypothesis, one proposes another hypothesis and 
sees whether the fi rst is consistent with the second, and one repeats 
the procedure until a non-hypothetical principle (arkhê) is reached. 
This is clearly a stripped-down account of the methodology set 
forth at the end of Republic VI.
83. Subsequent Neoplatonists will divide dialectic into division, analysis, defi nition 
and demonstration; cf. below.
84. These are (1) division of genus into species; (2) of whole into parts; (3) of a word 
into its meanings; (4) of accidents into their substrates; (5) of substrates into ac-
cidents. Boethius (De divisione, ad init.) reports an almost identical division, which 
he adopts from Andronicus by way of Porphyry; cf. Porphyry fr. 169F Smith. One 
fi rst takes the genus of the thing to be defi ned, and then cuts it up (Greek temnein) 
according to its proximate differences: for instance, wishing to defi ne ‘man’, one 
takes its genus ‘animal’, then divides ‘animal’ into ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ or 
‘mortal’ and ‘immortal’. Finally, by adding these proximate differences to ‘ani-
mal’, one obtains the defi nition of ‘man’.
85. Cf. M. MARÓTH, Ibn Sina und die peripatetische «Aussagenlogik», (Brill, Leiden, 
1989) 102f.
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It is Alcinoos’ second type of analysis that most interests us 
here. Here, one assumes what is being sought (to zêtoumenon) and 
considers the things that are prior to it, demonstrating them by 
ascending from posterior to prior things86 until one arrives at what 
is primary and agreed upon (homologoumenon).87 From this point, 
Alcinoos adds, one will descend to the thing being sought by means 
of  the synthetic method.88
The parallels we can observe between Alcinoos’ account of his 
second type of analysis and the accounts we have studied of analysis 
and synthesis in Greek geometry make it clear that Alcinoos is not 
following Aristotelian methodology here, any more than Chalcidius 
is, but the synthetic/analytic method as codifi ed by the Greek ge-
ometers.89 It becomes all the more likely, therefore, that Origen was 
right, and that Celsus too was referring to geometrical practices in 
his discussion the ways to achieve knowledge of God.
For Alcinoos, assuming the proposition under investigation, 
for instance that the soul is immortal, analysis proceeds through a 
series of “consequences” until some proposition is reached that is 
agreed upon by all: what the Arabo-Islamic geometers would later 
call “the knowns”. Synthesis then starts out from this agreed-upon 
proposition and covers the same steps in reverse. Ideally, one ends 
up in this way with a demonstration whose conclusion is that the 
soul is imperishable, ungenerated, and immortal.
86. ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ πρότερα ἀνιόντα Alc., Didasc. 157, 24-25 Hermann; cf. 
Chalcidius: quae <ex> posterioribus ad praecedentium indaginem gradatim peru-
enit, quod genus probationis resolutio dicitur.
87. ἕως ἂν ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὁμολογούμενον Alc.; ἐπί τι ἀληθὲς 
ὁμολογούμενον; schol. Eucl.; “Then we resolve it to something whose proof is 
already had”, Hero ap. al-Nayrīzī (trans. Lo Bello); ἕως ἂν οὕτως ἀναποδίζοντες 
καταντήσωμεν εἴς τι τῶν ἤδη γνωριζομένων ἢ τάξιν ἀρχῆς ἐχόντων Pappus.
88. ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ ἀρξάμενοι ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον κατελευσόμεθα συνθετικῷ τρόπῳ· Alc.; 
“synthesis, that is when one begins with the known things; then one combines 
them until what is sought is found” Hero ap. al-Nayrīzī (trans. Lo Bello modi-
fi ed); τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει καταληφθὲν ὕστατον ὑποστησάμενοι γεγονὸς ἤδη, (...) εἰς 
τέλος ἀφικνούμεθα τῆς τοῦ ζητουμένου κατασκευῆς Pappus.
89. A point that seems to have been missed by Whittaker in his otherwise excellent 
edition of ALCINOOS (Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1990).
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6. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS IN THE LATER COMMENTATORS ON 
ARISTOTLE: ANALYSIS AS A SUBDIVISION OF DIALECTICS
6.1 Alexander of Aphrodisias
Like his near-contemporary Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl . 
200CE)90 knows that analysis, which is the reduction of compound 
things to their elements, is the converse of synthesis, which is the 
path from principles to their derivatives. In addition to the reduc-
tion of compound to simple bodies, Alexander tells us, there are 
various senses of the term ‘analysis’, including analysis of simple 
things into their matter and form; of a phrase into parts of speech, 
syllables, and fi nally letters; of compound syllogisms into simple 
ones, and of simple ones into their premises; of imperfect syllogisms 
to perfect ones, and of syllogisms into their fi gures. Alexander (or 
someone in his circle) also knows of a “proof (deixis) by analysis”91 
that serves, as in Chalcidius, Celsus, and Alcinoos, for achieving 
knowledge of otherwise unknowable fi rst principles:
For it is not possible for there to be a demonstration (apodeixis) 
of the fi rst principle, but one must begin with what is posterior 
and manifest, and establish its nature by making use of analysis 
in accordance with the agreement with these things.
6.2 Porphyry and Proclus
In his Commentary on Euclid, the Athenian Neoplatonist Proclus (c. 
412-485)92 provides a classifi cation of analysis and synthesis within 
the series of mathematical proofs.
90. In Anal pr. 1, 7, 11ff. Cf. SCHRENK, op. cit., 101-2.
91. ALEXANDER (?), Quaestiones 4.3-7: ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τῆς πρώτης 
ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους κατὰ 
τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν. The 
authorship of the Quaestiones is disputed, but one may assume that the doctrines 
they transmit are not too far removed from the views of the Aphrodisian.
92. In Eucl., 255, 13-23 Friedlein.
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In general, one should know that all mathematical proofs are 
either from the principles or toward the principles, as Por-
phyry says somewhere.93 Those that are from the principles 
are also twofold, for they either start out from the common 
notions and the mere clarity of what is credible in itself, or 
from things that have been shown previously. 
Those that go toward the principles either posit the principles 
or negate them. If they posit them, they are called analyses, 
and opposite to these are the syntheses—for it is possible to 
proceed in good order from those principles to what is being 
sought, and this is synthesis—but if they are negative they are 
called reductio ad impossibile.
Here we have a clear statement of the idea that analysis, by which, 
as Proclus tells us elsewhere,94 one reduces the problem under in-
vestigation to (epi) a principle (arkhê) that everyone agrees on, is 
the reverse process to synthesis, by which one proceeds from the 
principles to the problem under investigation. Interestingly, Proclus 
attributes the analytic method to none other than Plato, who then 
transmitted the technique to a certain Leodamas.95 This attribution 
is usually dismissed as mere fabulation; but our study so far has per-
haps suggested there may be a grain of truth to the story. While it is 
unlikely that Plato invented analysis, it does not seem to be impos-
sible that he adopted a method already in use among contemporary 
geometers, and adapted it to use in philosophy.96
93. PORPHYRY, fr. 482, p. 552 Smith.
94. In Eucl., p. 211, 19-212, 3.
95. Leodamas of Thasos; cf. Diogenes Laertius 3, 24.
96. Cf. SCHRENK, op. cit., 96 and n. 11. Writing without any apparent knowledge of 
the doctrines of Alcinoos or later Platonists, P. TANNÉRY La géométrie grecque. 
Comment son histoire nous est parvenue et ce que nous en savons. Essai critique. Première 
partie, Histoire générale de la géométrie élémentaire, (Gauthier-Villers, Paris, 1887) 
112-113 (Reprint Hildesheim etc.: Georg Olms, 1998). Tannéry already suggest-
ed that Republic VI contained an attempt at a systematization of the method of 
analysis and synthesis, which consists in “remonter de l’hypothèse au principe non 
supposé; suivre la marche inverse du principe à l’hypothèse”. Cf. Heath, citing 
Rep. VI 510B; 511A-C. T. HEATH, A History of Greek Mathematics. 1, From Thales 
to Euclid, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921); FESTUGIÈRE, op. cit., 120.
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6.3 Ammonius
Proclus’ student Ammonius (c. 440-520)97 is also familiar with phil-
osophical analysis and synthesis. Synthesis, he writes, is the path 
from simple forms (such as the Beautiful in itself) toward compound 
things (Beauty as exemplifi ed in the intellect, soul, and body). Anal-
ysis is the reverse path, from the form or idea within sensibles to the 
forms in the intelligibles. There is also geometrical analysis, which 
Geminos described as the discovery of a demonstration.98
Elsewhere,99 Ammonius speaks of a division, already well-
known to his teacher Proclus,100 of Platonic dialectics into division, 
defi nition, demonstration and analysis.101 Of these, he tells us, divi-
sion divides the genus into its differences in an orderly manner, defi -
nition gives the essence of each thing from its genus and constitutive 
differences, while demonstration demonstrates things on the basis 
of their substance and of defi nitions. Finally, analytics analyses com-
pound things into the simple things of which they are composed, as 
one analyses a phrase into nouns and verbs, then syllables, then let-
ters. Likewise, philosophers analyze man into head, hands and feet; 
these into bones, fl esh and nerves, and these into elements. One also 
analyses syllogisms into premises, and these into terms.102
97. In anal. pr. I, 5, 19-31.
98. Cf. SCHRENK, op. cit., 97.
99. In Porph. Isag., 34, 15ff.
100. Cf. G. VAN RIEL, Damascius, Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon,; en collab. avec 
C. MACÉ, J. FOLLON (Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2008) 18 n. 2, citing Proclus, In 
Crat. 2-3, pp. 1.10-2.1; In Parm., I.649.14-651.7; 5.980.3-982.40; 1003.6-29; In 
Tim. I, p. 276.1014; Theol. plat. I 9, p. 40.5-10; De prov. 30.1-4. Additional texts 
are cited by Westerink in the Introduction to his Budé edition of the anonymous 
Prolegomena to Philosophy (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1990), p. lxxiv.
101. Cf. Alcinoos’ division, discussed above, into division, defi nition, analytics, induc-
tion, and syllogism. One example from Arabo-Islamic philosophy: in opening 
chapter of the Liber Introductorius, (A. NAGY, Die Philosophischen Abhandlungen des 
Ja’qūb ben Isḥāq al-Kindī, (Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, Münster, 1897) 41, long 
attributed to Al-Kindī but now recognized as a Latin translation of the treatise Fī 
Anūlūṭīqā al-Ulā of the 10th-century Encyclopaedia of the Brethren of Purity (Iḫwān 
al-Ṣafā’), we read of the viae per quas ambulauerunt philosophi, in illis disciplinis, 
in quibus sua inquisitio fuit de cognitione certitudinis rerum, comprehenduntur in 
quatuor speciebus, scilicet divisione et resolutione, defi nitione et demonstratione. 
Note the different order of enumeration, with analysis/resolutio being promoted 
from last to second place. I thank Dr. Irene Caiazzo for pointing out this text to me.
102. Cf. SCHRENK, op. cit., 101.
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6.4 Philoponus
As Richard Sorabji has pointed out (2004, Vol. 3, p. 268-9), some of 
the most perspicuous accounts of the method of analysis and synthe-
sis comes from Ammonius’ student John Philoponus (c. 490-570). 
Discussing geometrical analysis,103 he tells us that it is the discovery 
of the premises leading to some true conclusion. Let’s assume, for 
instance, that the triangle before us is equilateral: we are to discover 
the premises leading up to this conclusion. As in the geometrical 
occurrences we studied above, so for Philoponus synthesis, the in-
verse process to analysis, begins with something agreed-upon (to 
homologoumenon) and stops at what is sought (to zêtoumenon). Analy-
sis, by contrast, takes what was previously sought as agreed-upon, 
whereupon we seek out the premises by which this conclusion has 
been established, until we arrive at things that are agreed upon and 
represent the principles of geometry.
Elsewhere (In APo, p. 334, 19ff.) Philoponus discusses the rea-
sons why Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is entitled “analytics”. There is 
one species of analysis, studied in the Prior Analytics, in which we ana-
lyze syllogisms into their moods and fi gures. There is another species, 
however, in which we analyze the known object into the principles 
and causes from which it has its being and its being known, and this 
is the sense in which demonstration is called analysis:104
For it is by analysis that its principles are discovered, as we 
ascend from effects, which are prior to us, to the causes, which 
are prior by nature. 
With its depiction of analysis as a process starting out from what is 
more manifest quoad nos and ascending to the discovery of causes 
and principles, while are more knowable per se, Philoponus’ expla-
nation harks back to Calcidius, who wrote about a century earlier. 
103. PHILOPONUS, In APo, 162-173.
104. PHILOPONUS, In APo, 335: ἐξ ἀναλύσεως γὰρ ἡμῖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ταύτης εὑρίσκονται ἀπὸ 
τῶν ἡμῖν προτέρων αἰτιατῶν ἀνιοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει πρότερα, ἤγουν τὰ αἴτια.
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Yet it also points forward the later Latin tradition, thereby offer-
ing a good illustration of the surprising persistence and longevity 
of this philosophical theme. Albertus Magnus, for instance, writes 
as follows in the preface to his own commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics:105 
There cannot help but be a twofold analysis, viz. of the con-
cluded thing into the principles and causes by which it is con-
cluded, and of the syllogism which is already collected and 
constituted into its formal principles...
Philoponus proceeds to illustrate his remarks by the well-known ex-
ample of the eclipse. We fi rst know through our senses that the moon 
undergoes eclipse, after which discursive thought (dianoia) fi nds the 
cause of this phenomenon. Analysis then constructs the following syl-
logism, which is an example of the ascent from caused to cause: “The 
moon is eclipsed, what is eclipsed intercepts the sun’s light, there-
fore the moon intercepts the sun’s light”. Demonstration, obtained 
by means of synthesis, then takes place by descending from causes to 
caused: The moon intercepts the sun’s light, what intercepts the sun’s 
light undergoes eclipse, therefore the moon undergoes eclipse.106
Thus, Philoponus elaborates upon the preceding meanings of 
analysis we have already studied, coming up with a pair of methodo-
logical approaches that resemble what we know today as induction 
and deduction. We have seen above that analysis was assimilated to 
Platonic diairesis, the art of dividing Forms by which we arrive at defi -
nitions. Now, Philoponus, perhaps following Pappus, makes it explicit 
105. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, In APo, vol. I, 460a Borgnet: Nec potest esse nisi duplex re-
solutio, scilicet rei conclusae in principia et causas per quas concluditur, et syllo-
gismi collecti jam et constituti in principia formalia.
106. Similarly, we may see the earth shaken, and say, beginning with the analysis, 
“The earth is shaken, but when it is shaken pneuma is enclosed in the earth’s 
hollows and caves. Pneuma is enclosed in the earth”. We then proceed with the 
demonstration: “Pneuma is enclosed within the earth, when pneuma is enclosed 
an earthquake takes place, therefore an earthquake takes place in the earth”. On 
the fact that synthesis, as the reverse procedure to analysis, is equivalent to dem-
onstration in mathematics and logic, see PAPPUS, Collectiones, I, 144, 22 Hultsch, 
cited by M. MARÓTH, op. cit., 102.
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that synthesis, the inverse method to analysis, corresponds to demon-
stration. Analysis infers from effect to cause, from the consequens to the 
antecedens, while synthesis infers from cause to effect, from antecedens 
to consequens. We thus have the following correspondences: 
analysis context of discovery induction (from effect to cause)
synthesis context of proof deduction (from cause to effect)
Thus, by the end of Antiquity, we have in the analysis/synthesis 
schema a model of scientifi c thought which presents strong analogies 
to distinctions that have played a crucial role in modern philosophy 
of science: that between context of discovery (analysis) and context of 
proof (deduction), on the one hand, and on the other that between 
induction and deduction. These distinctions would have lasting im-
pact on subsequent Arabo-Islamic and Latin Scholastic thought.107
6.5. Elias
Finally, one of the most interesting ancient Greek texts concerning 
synthesis and analysis comes from Elias,108 one of the last known Neo-
platonic commentators on Aristotle in Late Antiquity, in the Pro-
logue he placed before his commentary on the Isagogê of Porphyry:
107. On analysis as an ars inveniendi see, for instance, THāBIT IBN QURRA, On how 
to be able to determine the construction of geometrical problems, in RASHED (ed.), op. 
cit., 742-764, which the editor describes (loc. cit., 690)  as “the fi rst work on the 
method of invention”. See also HASNAWI, op. cit., 29-30.
108. First called to attention, as far as I know, by Schrenk. Unfortunately, this author’s 
mistranslation of the fourth dialectical problem dia ti estin as “through what it is” 
rather than “for what <reason> it is” (104) prevented him from seeing this prob-
lem’s relation to the Aristotelian fi nal cause. Whether this Prologue to Porphyry’s 
Isagoge (Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias, A. BUSSE (ed.), “CAG” 
18/1 (1900) 1-104) is really by Elias or should rather be attributed to David is a 
matter of scholarly debate, but need not be entered into here (we know almost 
nothing about either fi gure, except that they probably date from the late 6th cen-
tury CE). For a summary of the controversy, see R. GOULET, Élias, “Dictionnaire 
des Philosophes Antiques” III, (Presses du CNRS, Paris, 2002) 57-66.
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But [the Isagoge also contributes] to the dialectical methods. 
There are four of these: divisive, defi nitional, demonstrative, 
and analytical, since the dialectical problems are also four in 
number: if it is, what it is, what it is like, and why it is.109 “If it 
is” is analogous to the divisive method (for “if it is” falls, at any 
rate, under division), while “what it is” <falls under> the defi ni-
tional method <for defi nitions present the “what-it-is”, while the 
“what it is like” falls under the demonstrative method>110 (for all 
demonstrations are of what a thing is like. The “if it is” is seldom 
controversial, and there is no demonstration of the defi nition), 
while the “why it is” is analogous to analytics, for each of them is 
the discovery of a cause. (...) the demonstrative method starts out 
from causes and fi rst things, while this one <sc. analysis> starts 
out from effects and secondary things: for analysis is nothing 
other than a reverse demonstration, whence <it is called> ‘analy-
sis’ insofar as it is a reverse solution of the matter at hand.111
This text deserves an ample commentary, for which this is not the 
place. Suffi ce it for the moment to say that it echoes several themes 
we have already glimpsed, and at the same time paves the way to the 
future. The term “synthesis” is not explicitly mentioned in it, but 
we can see from the last phrase of our quotation that it is here being 
tacitly identifi ed with demonstration. Elias discusses the familiar 
quaternity of dialectical methods in the order that, as we have seen, 
had been canonical at least since Proclus: division, defi nition, dem-
onstration, and analysis, and allows us to understand why they are 
enumerated in that order: division allows the construction of defi ni-
109. Elias has introduced these four dialectical questions earlier in his Commentary on 
the Isagoge: cf. p. 3, 5ff. Busse, where he speaks of the “dialectial law (nomos diale-
ktikos) which states that in the case of all arts and sciences, one must investigate 
four problems: if it is, what it is, what it is like, and why it is”. They go back at 
least to Proclus (In Alcibiadem, 275, vol. 2, p. 316, 1-4 Segonds), who off-handedly 
attributes them to Aristotle (Eirêtai pou kalôs hupo tou Aristotelous).
110. Since the Greek text presents a lacuna here, I have translated Busse’s conjecture 
in his apparatus criticus.
111. Cf. Pappus and Ibn al-Ṭayyib, quoted above.
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tions, which then represent the starting-point for demonstration.112
The signifi cance of this text for the future lies in its associa-
tion of the four species of dialectic with the four “dialectical ques-
tions”, which are similar to,113 yet signifi cantly different from, the 
four questions enumerated by Aristotle at the beginning of Book 
II of the Posterior Analytics. These four dialectical questions, whose 
origin is in fact, I believe, to be sought in part in the rhetorical tra-
dition of Hermogenes,114 are subsequently associated with the four 
Aristotelian causes: 
Arist., 
APo 89b23-25
Elias, 
In Porph. Isag.
species 
of dialectic
Aristotelian 
causes
to hoti 
(the fact)
ei esti 
(if it is)
division effi cient cause
to dioti 
(the why)
ti estin 
(what it is)
defi nition formal cause
ei esti 
(if it is)
hopoion ti esti 
(what sort of 
thing it is)
demonstration material cause
ti estin 
(what it is)
dia ti estin 
(why it is)
analysis fi nal cause
112. AMMONIUS, In Porph. Isag., p. 34, 17-36, 19. Cf. SCHRENK, op. cit., 103-104.
113. The Commentators occasionally attribute this “Elias series” to Aristotle, and 
more specifi cally to the Posterior Analytics: cf. OLYMPIODORUS, In Gorg., 2, 8, 8 
(there is no mention of the disparity in R. JACKSON, K. LYCOS AND H. TARRANT, 
transl., Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias, (Brill, Leiden, 1998) 74); 
ASCLEPIUS, In Metaph., 448, 13-14. 
114. Hermogenes of Tarsus (latter half of the 2nd cent. CE) mentions at least the fi rst 
three questions, in the same order as Elias. Cf. Peri staseôn, in M. PATILLON (ed.), 
Corpus Rhetoricum. 2, Hermogène, Les états de cause, 2, 14, 17-18: whether a thing 
is (ei esti) is the domain of conjecture (stokhasmos); what it is (ti esti) is examined in 
the defi nition, and what kind of thing it is (hopoion ti est) is studied in the remain-
ing states of cause. Later commentators on Hermogenes add the fourth question, 
dia ti estin.
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It is this later scheme, in the form given it by such late Greek 
commentators as Elias, David and Eustratius, that is then taken up 
the medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophical tradition.115 But that 
is another story.
7. CONCLUSION
To sum up this long and complex journey: there appears to have 
existed, at least as early as the time of Plato’s Academy, a math-
ematical method of analysis and synthesis in which one started out 
by supposing as solved the problem under discussion (to zêtoume-
non), and then traced back the argumentative steps to an axiom, 
principle, or notion accepted by all (to homologoumenon). One then 
confi rmed this result by starting out from the homologoumenon and 
reversing one’s steps, in a downward, synthetic movement toward 
the zêtoumenon. Perhaps as early as Plato’s time, this methodology 
was adapted to the needs of philosophy, where it was interpreted as a 
means for coming to know the highest principles. According to this 
method, one starts out from the sensible world and abstracts from 
it the various spatial dimensions that constitute it: just as one fi nds 
a mathematical point, and then an intelligible monad, by mentally 
abstracting dimensions, from body, plane, and line, so we can fi nd 
God, the Intelligible world, or even matter (which is also a princi-
ple) by a similar process of abstraction, and we can then confi rm this 
process by starting out from the principle thus obtained and putting 
back together what we had taken apart, confi rming the nature of 
God or the Intelligible from the sensible, extended features of the 
world that emerge from them. 
In the course of a millennium of thought, both the mathemati-
cal and the philosophical versions of the analytic/synthetic method 
underwent important modifi cations, becoming associated with a 
115. See the opening chapter of the Book of Defi nitions by Isaac Israeli (c. 832-c. 932), 
with the parallel passages cited by A. ALTMANN, S. M. STERN, Isaac Israeli. A Neo-
platonic philosopher of the early tenth century. His works translated with comments and 
an outline of his Philosophy, (U. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2009) from al-Kindī, 
Ibn al-Ṭayyib, al-Ṭabarī, Miskawayh, al-Khuwārismi, al-Jāḥiẓ.
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 103-139
QUOD EST PRIMUM IN COMPOSITIONE, EST ULTIMUM IN RESOLUTIONE
139
number of new contexts: Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic, with 
their division into diairesis, defi nition, and demonstration; the con-
trast between methods of discovery and methods of proof, induction 
and deduction; and perhaps the interpretation of the rhetoric of 
Hermogenes. As time went on, it is quite possible that the philoso-
phers themselves who transmitted the evidence we have of this com-
plex of thought were unaware of its origins. Thus, when Chalcidius 
and Alcinoos speak of analysis as a process of abstraction used for 
discovering ultimate principles, and again as a subsection of Platonic 
dialectics, and again, this time paired more explicitly with the cor-
responding downward path of synthesis, as a method of discovery, 
they may be uncertain as to how these seemingly different processes 
are, or at least, were at one point, connected; hence the occasional 
confusion and vagueness of their expositions, and their attempt to 
clarify the confusion by introducing, for instance, several subspecies 
of analysis. Matters were even less clear for such thinkers as Albertus 
Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who had considerably less knowledge 
of the Platonic/Academic origins of these notions than did Alcinous 
or Chalcidius. By picking up on hints in the sources to which they 
did have access, they were able, thanks to their own philosophical 
creativity, to render the notions of analysis and synthesis fruitful 
once again. Yet the extent of their creativity and originality can be 
properly measured only against the background of the history of 
these notions.116
116. I would like to thank my anonymous readers for their valuable suggestions.
